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The education effect on income across two 
generations in EU welfare states
Stefanos Papanastasiou, Panteion University
 
H επίδραση της εκπαίδευσης στο εισόδηµα µεταξύ 
δύο γενεών σε κράτη πρόνοιας της ΕΕ
Στέφανος Παπαναστασίου, Πάντειο Πανεπιστήµιο 
ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ 
Αξιοποιώντας µικροδεδοµένα της EU-SILC του 
2011 και χρησιµοποιώντας τεχνικές παλινδρό-
µησης σε τέσσερα κράτη πρόνοιας της ΕΕ (δηλ. 
Ελλάδα, Γαλλία, Ιρλανδία και Σουηδία), το άρθρο 
αυτό καταδεικνύει τη µειούµενη επίδραση της 
εκπαίδευσης στα εισοδηµατικά επιτεύγµατα µε-
ταξύ δύο γενεών. Το εύρηµα αυτό θέτει υπό αµ-
φισβήτηση το κύριο επιχείρηµα του κυρίαρχου 
ακαδηµαϊκού και πολιτικού λόγου γύρω από τον 
πρωτεύοντα ρόλο της εκπαίδευσης για την άντλη-
ση εισοδήµατος. Αντίθετα, το άρθρο αυτό τονίζει 
τη σηµασία άλλων παραγόντων για την ερµηνεία 
των εισοδηµατικών επιτευγµάτων, όπως η κοινω-
νική διασυνδεσιµότητα. Η τελευταία µπορεί να 
παράγει ή να αναπαράγει την ανισότητα εφόσον 
τα άτοµα αποκτούν πρόσβαση σε ισχυρές θέσεις 
µέσω της χρήσης των κοινωνικών συνδέσεων. 
Έτσι, οι ανώτερες κοινωνικές τάξεις µε εκτεταµέ-
νη κοινωνική δικτύωση διατηρούν τα κοινωνικά 
προνόµια µεταξύ των γενεών παρά το επιχείρηµα 
ότι η σύγχρονη κοινωνία επιδεικνύει υψηλή κοι-
νωνική κινητικότητα που επιτυγχάνεται µέσω της 
επίσηµης εκπαίδευσης.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙ∆ΙΑ: Εκπαίδευση, εισόδηµα, κοινω-
νική κινητικότητα, κράτος πρόνοιας, ΕΕ.
ABSTRACT
By utilizing EU-SILC 2011 microdata and 
employing regression techniques in four EU 
welfare states (i.e., Greece, France, Ireland 
and Sweden), this paper demonstrates the 
diminishing education effect on income at-
tainments between two generations. This 
finding puts into doubt the main argument 
of the mainstream academic and political dis-
course over the prominent role of education 
for income acquisition. Instead, this paper 
stresses the importance of other factors ex-
plaining income attainments, such as social 
interconnectivity. The latter can produce or re-
produce inequality as long as people gain ac-
cess to powerful positions through the usage 
of social connections. Thus, the upper social 
classes with extended social networking pre-
serve their social privileges across generations 
despite the argument that the contemporary 
society boasts high social mobility attained 
through formal education.
KEY WORDS: Εducation, income, social 
mobility, welfare state, ΕU.
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1. Introduction
T he family ties have long been recognized as playing a central role in the reproduction of social inequality, and it is clear that a host of life outcomes are tied to the family of origin in 
complex ways. Children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds generally tend to have poorer 
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outcomes along many dimensions: health, school, job, money, etc. (Bianchi, Hotz and Seltzer, 
2011). The relations across generations have been the main channel by which social inequality 
persists through time (Papanastasiou and Papatheodorou, forthcoming). It was also argued that 
social inequality itself tends to create the circumstances for its self-reproduction over time, a 
process coined “circular cumulative causation” by Myrdal (1963; 1944). 
Social inequality is multidimensional caused both by aggregated factors such as macro-
economic, social and labor policies and by individual factors like social interactions, health 
status and education level (Grudiza and Vilaplana-Lopez, 2013).For many decades, however, the 
emphasis in tackling social inequality was placed on various forms of education both on the sup-
ply and demand side (Nolan et al, 2011). Compatible with the Pareto’s principle of optimality, 
education gained the status of the “great leveler” of individuals’ life chances (Bernardi, 2016; 
Cremin and Kendell, 2003). However, despite extensive education reforms in the past decades, 
inequality of opportunity still persists in modern societies at an alarming level (OECD, 2017). 
Thus, the empirical evidence put into question the main rationale of the “human capital” theory 
(Becker et al, 2015; Becker and Tomes, 1986; 1979) over the prominent role of education for 
life attainments. 
Against this backdrop, this paper analyzes the education effect along the income dimension 
between two generations by utilizing EU-SILC 2011 microdata and employing proper sociometric 
techniques in four EU welfare states (Greece, France, Ireland and Sweden). Next, we delineate 
the “human capital” theory’s arguments and assess its compatibility with the empirical reality. 
Then, we describe the data and methodology of the analysis and present empirical estimates on 
the education effect on income across generations in the EU context. Finally, we summarize the 
main empirical findings and make concluding remarks.
2. Human capital and income
T he family of origin is the main determinant of a person’s welfare prospects both in childhood and adulthood. This occurs by transmitting genetic characteristics, material resources, 
social networks, cultural experiences, etc. The theoretical views over the family background 
effect on offspring’s attainments differ considerably. Unarguably, though, the human capital 
interpretation has gained great popularity by cultivating the belief that social inequality is due to 
low productivity because of insufficient education and training among the poor (Becker, 1993; 
Schultz, 1966;Mincer, 1958).
The human capital theory investigates poverty reproduction through the parental practices 
to invest family resources in the children’s human capital to maximize their welfare (Becker et al, 
2015; Becker and Tomes, 1986; 1979). Becker and Tomes’ model takes the following form:
lnY
c
= (1 + r)lnY
p
+ η
c
+ λ
c 
in which Ycdenotes the children’s income and r the degree of economic return of parental invest-
ment in the children’s human capital, while Ycdepends on the parental income Yp, the inherited 
traits ηcκαι luckλc.The parents influence their children’s welfare unwittingly by inheriting genetic 
traits, cognitive abilities and cultural values/attitudes (nature),but also wittingly by allocating the 
limited family recourses to invest in their children’ human capital (nurture).Becker and Tomes 
(1979,1986) assumed that when there are no liquidity constraints the parents will be investing in 
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their children’s human capital as long as the marginal benefit surpasses the marginal cost.By con-
trast, when there are credit constraints, the children’s welfare depends on heritability (i.e., innate 
abilities), given that the parents cannot borrow money to invest in their children’s human capital. 
That occurs among poor families having no other choice but to reduce the investment in their 
children’s human capital. On the contrary, more well-off families do not face the same dilemma be-
cause, despite the liquidity constraints, the opportunity cost by investing in the children’s human 
capital is lesser and, thus, they can keep investing in an optimal way. In that sense, the regression 
of income to the mean evolves slower in poor families compared to more affluent families.
The abovementioned empirical findings exerted great influence on the scientific thinking and 
policy making in the developed world. Insofar as the causes of intergenerational social immobility 
are related to the lack of poor families’ economic resources as best practice is considered to be 
the redistribution of income in favor of the less well-off families to finance the accumulation of 
the children’s human capital. Nevertheless, Becker and Tomes are skeptical over an income redis-
tribution strategy. In contrast, they are in favor of a wide scale human capital redistribution from 
rich to poor families. In that sense, the best policy interventions are direct public investments in 
health, childcare, typical education, job-related training, etc. of children. This strategy appears to 
be compatible with the Pareto’s principle because it reinforces the acquisition of human capital 
by poor families without causing changes in the broader income distribution. This “soft” strategy 
tends to favor the priorities of the political and economic elite, as they do not wish a wide income 
redistribution strategy that could shake the power relations in contemporary societies. 
Nonetheless, the educational reforms during the second half of the 20th century did not 
bring about the expected results in terms of the equalization of opportunities among individu-
als from different socioeconomic backgrounds (Heineck and Riphahn, 2007). Contrary to Becker 
and Tomes’ model, empirical findings indicate that the differences in the public investment in 
education cannot explain the variation of intergenerational social mobility among the devel-
oped countries (Esping-Andersen, 2007; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). 
What is more, many remain skeptical over the levelling of the playing field through widening 
the educational opportunities, inasmuch as the typical education tends to disproportionately 
benefit the children from rich families as compared to the children of poor families (Esping-
Andersen, 2005; Blanden and Machin, 2004; Blandenand Gregg, 2004; Acemoglu and Pischke, 
2001; Ellwood and Kane, 2000).
This argument can be viewed from the perspective of the economic return of tertiary edu-
cation. Even if investing in human capital regresses to the mean between poor and rich families 
due to public education policies, the social inequalities may persist as long as the economic 
returns from education remain uneven between rich and poor people (Corak, 2006; Mayer and 
Loppo, 2004; Musick and Mare, 2004). Corak (2006) demonstrated that the extent to which 
the human capital is rewarded in the market has implications for intergenerational social mo-
bility. Countries exhibiting high private rewards to education appear to be having low inter-
generational income or wage mobility. The magnitude of inequality depends on the degree of 
compression of the wage structure in the labor market. In consequence, eliminating poverty 
reproduced across generations depends not only on the widening of access to tertiary education 
of children from poor families, but mainly through widening the prospects of capitalizing the 
economic returns from tertiary education. Thus, labor market policies aiming at reducing the 
wage dispersion among workers is essential for eliminating the importance of social inheritance 
as determinant of individual welfare. Empirical studies put into question even the main as-
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sumption of Becker and Tomes’ model over the primacy of education for future income or wage 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002; Breen and Goldthorpe, 2001). In this context, Warrenet al(2002) 
estimated that the direct effect of education on future wage is low and is getting even lower 
during someone’s work career. Moreover, Card (1999) estimated that education can explain only 
the 1/5 of the variability in wages. 
The human capital approach has come under great criticism, since subsequent studies do 
not corroborate its main findings, insofar as intergenerational social “stickiness” appeared to be 
lower among high-income families rather than low-income ones (Graw και Mulligan, 2002). Cor-
ak and Heisz (1999) estimated that the association in income among parents and children takes 
the form of an inversed U, implying that intergenerational social mobility is low at the lower 
and upper part of the income distribution and high in the middle. Grawe (2004) moved a step 
forward by arguing that the shape of mobility along the income distribution was not affected by 
the presence or not of credit constraints in the economy and it can take whichever form. Over 
the last years, sociometric studies found non-linear intergenerational social mobility by utilizing 
non-parametric techniques (Grawe, 2004a,b; Corak and Heisz, 1999). These findings reinforce 
the argument that the relationship between income or wage among parents and children is 
mediated by non-observable factors related to the family or broader structures and institutions of 
modern societies (Corak, 2006). Bowels and Gintis (2002) argued that there might be different 
mechanisms acting on different points in the parents and children’s income distribution, which 
are not captured by studies focusing on estimating intergenerational income or wage elasticity. 
These studies may capture intergenerational social mobility in an average number, but they lack 
in investigating other mechanisms playing major role within intergenerational social mobility 
(Bratsberget al, 2006).
Moreover, subsequent empirical studies pointed out that Becker and Tomes had underes-
timated intergenerational income elasticity (0.2), because they relied on a non-representative 
homogenized sample and used the income of one year instead of a longer timespan(Solon, 1999; 
1992; 1989).As a consequence, Becker and Tomes’ model suffers from a downward bias of the 
β
1
 coefficient due to sample homogeneity, transitory fluctuations of income and life-cycle differ-
ences between parents and children (Mazumder, 2005; 2001; Bratberget al, 2003; Deardenet al, 
1997; Zimmerman, 1992; Solon, 1992). Subsequent studies showed that employing the income 
of one year as proxy of permanent income introduces a transitory component in the standard 
equation of intergenerational social mobility including both observable and non-observable ef-
fects. In consequence, the β
1 
coefficient tends to become underrated, even after the statistical 
control of the observable effects, due to the existence of the non-observable ones. Therefore, 
many researchers have questioned the finding that the income is regressing to the mean rapidly 
in the developed countries. 
Newer studies overcame to a large extent many of these weaknesses by utilizing newer and 
of better quality data and methodologies and by computing the parental income for a timespan 
much longer than one year. They found that intergenerational income elasticity was much greater 
instead of the Becker and Tomes’ previous rather optimistic estimates (Mazumder, 2005; 2001; 
Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). In particular, Mazumder’s (2005) study belongs to the third 
generation of studies on intergenerational social mobility overcoming many shortcomings of the 
previous two generations by calculating income for a very long timespan further reducing the 
downward bias of the β1 coefficient due to minimizing the transitory fluctuations of income, but 
also by using more reliable data dealing with the sample’s small size and attrition.
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3. Data, methodology and empirical estimates
T he main dataset used in the analysis is EU-SILC, which is the reference source for comparative statistics on income distribution and social inclusion in the EU. It is used for policy monitor-
ing within the OMC. EU-SILC is a multi-purpose instrument which focuses mainly on income. 
Detailed data are collected on income components, mostly on personal income. The reference 
population in EU-SILC includes all private households (Eurostat, 2016). 
Secondary variables are collected in the so-called ad-hoc modules. They include information 
either at household or personal level about specific topics, such as the intergenerational trans-
mission of disadvantages in the 2011 dataset, which is at the core of this analysis. The informa-
tion was provided for all current household members or if applicable for all selected respondents, 
aged 25-59. The eligible persons were those with a year of birth comprised between 1951 and 
1985, both years being included. The reference period was when the interviewee was around 14 
years old (Eurostat, 2012).
The main methodological choice was quantile regression along with the standard linear 
regression for several reasons. OLS summarizes the average association between a set of regres-
sors and the outcome variable based on the conditional mean function. However, this provides 
only a partial view of the association, whereas quantile regression is capable of describing the 
association at different points in the conditional distribution of y (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
Median regression is more robust to outliers than OLS and is semiparametric as it avoids as-
sumptions about the parametric distribution of the error terms (Koenker, 2005). This feature makes 
quantile regression especially suitable for heteroskedastic data (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). What 
is more, a certain type of quantile regression estimated the model with bootstrap standard errors, 
retaining the assumption of independent errors but relaxing the assumption of identically distrib-
uted errors. Thus, they are analogous to robust standard errors in OLS (Baum, 2013). 
The response variable was the net employee cash or near cash income, which corresponds to 
the gross income but the tax at source, the social insurance contributions, or both, are deducted. 
Negative or zero values as well as outliers and influential observations were omitted from the 
analysis (although quantile regression is far less sensitive to the presence of outliers unlike OLS, 
as already mentioned). The natural logarithm of the net income was used to further reduce het-
eroskedasticity and achieve a reasonably symmetric distribution.
The sample comprising both men and women was reduced to the productive 30 to 60 years 
on the age scale to achieve income maturity and consistency by avoiding income fluctuations 
among young people and income ceilings among the older ones. Another reason for the choice 
of the specific age category instead of a more condensed one was the adequacy of the sample 
size (N) in all countries.
The countries under study were old EU member states, that is, France, Greece, Ireland and 
Sweden, which represent the four welfare regimes (i.e., Conservative-Corporatist, South-Europe-
an, Liberal and Social-democratic respectively) according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology 
and the relevant debate on the welfare states of the south European countries (Liebfried, 1993; 
Ferrera, 1996; Papatheodorou and Petmesidou, 2005; 2004). 
The main predicting variable was education, of both father’s and offspring’s, as certain 
assumptions over the education effect on income across generations were explicitly tested. 
The education variable was split into two categories to satisfy the purposes of this analysis: 
1) moderate (i.e., pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and post-secondary 
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non-tertiary) and 2) high (i.e., first and second stage of tertiary education). This categorization 
was based on the International Standard Classification of Education 1997 (ISCED-97) and Wald 
tests showed no considerable loss of information by merging the various categories. Other con-
trol variables included number of children in the household, presence of both spouses, gender, 
health status and locality. 
The epicenter of this analysis was the education effect on income across generations in 
EU countries representing different welfare systems. Due to heteroskedasticity of the data, the 
natural logarithm of income was used as the dependent variable. The independent variables were 
used as dummies except for the number of children, which retained its initial numeric format. The 
logarithmic transformation of income provided fairly symmetric distributions in all countries. The 
empirical analysis utilized both OLS and quantile regression techniques to get a complete picture 
of the human capital effect on income from an intergenerational point of view. The results from 
OLS as well as QR at specific quantiles (.25, .50. 75) are presented for each country in Table 1. The 
QR standard errors use the robust formula except for the last median regression model obtaining 
bootstrap standard errors.
As shown in Table 1, the OLS regression estimates indicated that the highest and statisti-
cally significant income premium by father’s education was in Ireland and the lowest one and 
statistically non-significant one in Sweden. Nevertheless, the β coefficients differed considerably 
across quantiles in all countries, showing a different picture when running QR. First, in terms of 
standard errors, we achieved more precision in the median regression, especially when bootstrap 
standard errors were obtained. Second, the effect of father’s education on offspring’s income 
became larger as we move up on the quantile scale, especially in Ireland, Greece and France. 
However, the picture changed when it came to child’s education, as the education effect on 
offspring’s income declined drastically along the quantile scale (with the exception of Sweden). 
So, what might be other determinants explaining offspring’s income when education is losing in 
importance, especially among the high social status families?
Figure 1 illustrates the cross-country differences in the education effect, of both father’s 
and offspring’s, along the income dimension by quantiles. There appeared to be an income pre-
mium for those children coming from high social status families as we move along the quan-
tiles, especially in Greece and France. However, the analysis showed that offspring’s education is 
enormously losing in importance for income attainments in Greece, Ireland and France, whereas 
there are great income premiums or penalties among offspring of high vs. moderate social status 
families, with the exception of Sweden in which the regressors’ line is pretty straight. This is 
strong evidence that education becomes less important as we move up on the educational lad-
der for income acquisition, implying that other factors might explain income attainments. This 
certainly brings to the forefront Bourdieu’s (1979) position over social capital and the way it can 
be employed to reproduce inequality, showing that people gain access to powerful positions 
through the usage of social connections. Bourdieu (1979) emphasized how upper social classes 
preserve their social privileges across generations despite the argument that the contemporary 
society boasts high social mobility attained through formal education.
issue24.indd   106 1/10/2018   12:56:52 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:13:00 |
SOCIAL COHESION AND DEVELOPMENT [107]
Table 1: OLS and QR regressions (results)
A. Greece
Ln (income) OLS QR.25 QR.50 QR.75 BSQR
Father’s high education
.077
(.048)
.030
(.072)
.078*
(.034)
.118*
(.031)
.078*
(.032)
Child’s high education
.372**
(.025)
.459***
(.042)
.288***
(.020)
.248***
(.018)
.288***
(.016)
N 2,239
B. France
Ln(income) OLS QR.25 QR.50 QR.75 BSQR
Father’s high education
.067
(.039)
.015
(.053)
.059*
(.019)
.168*
(.024)
.059**
(.023)
Child’s high education
.536***
(.023)
.472***
(.034)
.378***
(.012)
.400***
(.015)
.378***
(.012)
N 7,746
C.Ireland
Ln(income) OLS QR.25 QR.50 QR.75 BSQR
Father’s high education
.137**
(.049)
.011
(.078)
.089*
(.049)
.168
(.038)
.089
(.047)
Child’s high education
.474***
(.040)
.633***
(.056)
.440***
(.035)
.314***
(.027)
.440***
(.035)
N 1,643
D. Sweden
Ln(income) OLS QR.25 QR.50 QR.75 BSQR
Father’s high education
.063
(.066)
.012*
(.058)
.074**
(.029)
.050
(.027)
.074**
(.028)
Child’s high education
.143**
(.048)
.085
(.046)
.111***
(.023)
.104***
(.021)
.111***
(.021)
N 1,757
Source: Elaboration of EU-SILC 2011 microdata. Control variables were included. The constant 
term is omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. *=.05, **=.01 and ***=.001.
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Figure 1: The education effect on income across generations
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Source: Elabora on of EU-SILC 2011 microdata
4. Concluding remarks 
T he aim of this paper was to assess the relationship between education and income from an intergenerational point of view in EU member states considered to be representative of 
the welfare state types in the EU. The main empirical findings when using OLS regression indi-
cated that the largest and statistically significant income premium by father’s education was 
documented in Ireland and the lowest and statistically non-significant one in Sweden. In some 
countries, the picture changed considerably when employing quantile regression techniques, as 
the father’s education effect on offspring’s income increased across the quantiles, particularly in 
Greece and France. 
However, the most interesting finding is the diminishing effect of offspring’s education 
on income across the quantiles in Greece, Ireland and France. In Sweden, the approximately 
straight line of the regressors indicates that there were no great income differences by father’s or 
offspring’s education, as we go up on the quantile scale, suggesting the achievement of equaliza-
tion of outcomes. 
Overall, the empirical findings suggest that education is losing in significance as a determi-
nant of income across generations in the EU. Once education was considered the biggest step-
ping stone for a great occupational career, but lately it becomes of less importance for income 
acquisition, especially as we go up on the educational ladder, while other factors like social 
interconnectivity appear to be playing increasingly more crucial role for income attainments, an 
argument profoundly elaborated by Bourdieu (1979). 
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